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THE PASSING OF JUSTICE MURPHY-THE
CONSCIENCE OF A COURT
On July 19, 1949, death ended the brilliant career of
Justice Frank Murphy, member of the Supreme Court of
the United States from February, 1940, till the day of his
unfortunate and premature demise. The loss which the
nation suffered in the passing of this liberal,' idealistic judge
was great; just how great must await the belated verdict
of an objective posterity. However, if this short, posthumous
appraisal of his philosophy and the contributions made by
him to our jurisprudence and to our constitutional develop-
ment serves, in the slightest, to reveal his judicial philosophy
and his real moral fiber, then the writer will be more than
satisfied. In a sense this effort is a memorial, even a eulogy,
if you will, to the late Justice Murphy. Nevertheless, its
basic purpose is not so much to praise, but to appraise the
place of Frank Murphy as he departs from the passing
scene.
In general, his death was much lamented by the respon-
sible press 2 and the enlightened commentators of the
nation.' Their sorrow and their appreciation of Justice
Murphy's character and abilities was shared, in general, by
many persons of stature and achievement.' On the other
1 The writer anticipates that he will be accused of free and easy use of the
word 'qiberal." It is a term admittedly of indefinite content. The writer, how-
ever, feels -like the Englishman who, when asked to define an elephant, said that
he couldn't, "but damn-well recognized one when he saw it." Justice Murphy's
deep concern for minority rights and- his protection of them against periodic
oppressions by the majority, plus his high regard for the dignity of the individual
and the basic political freedoms that should be accorded the individual, entitle
him, in the opinion of the writer, to be classified properly as a "liberal."
2 See, e.g., the laudatory editorial in the N. Y. Times, July 20, 1949, p. 24,
col. 3.
8 Doris Fleeson, in her syndicated column, indicated that she felt Murphy
had "kept the faith." Chi. Daily News, July 23, 1949, p. 5, col. 3. Even more
sympathetic in its appraisal of Justice Murphy's career on the bench was an
'editorial written by Michael Straight. New Republic, Aug. 1, 1949, p. 4.
4 See, e.g., the comments of Chief Justice Vinson, Justice Tom Clark, Justice
Reed, Justice Burton, Phillip Murray, John L. Lewis and others in the N. Y.
Times, July 20, 1949, p. 26, col. 2.
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hand, the pathological bias of some of Justice Murphy's
journalistic traducers was unrestrained even in the hour of
his death. To be a humanitarian is a sin, which in the eyes
of some, warrants a stigma and a cross which must be carried
even beyond the grave.5
However, the contrasting sorrows and satisfactions voiced
at Justice Murphy's death are, perhaps, appropriate, because
most of his adult political life was a role which allowed of
little mixed feeling toward him. He was either loved and
admired, or ridiculed and hated. Therefore, let the chips
fall where they may when this writer ventures to assert
that cases and events make it very clear that Frank Murphy
was "the conscience of the Supreme Court" on matters of
civil liberty, individual freedom, and the right to dissent.
In addition, it is believed that the record of his performance
on the high bench warrants the judgment that he grasped,
as few high judges have, the correct scope of the judicial
function in a constitutional democracy. Those are high
accomplishments to claim for any man. Let us see if the
record substantiates the claim.
While his early education need not concern us long, it is
interesting to note that after graduating from Michigan
Law School Frank Murphy did graduate work at Lincoln's
Inn, London, and at Trinity College, Dublin. Perhaps this
early study in a foreign country helped to shape his broad,
catholic approach to the law, and assisted in formulating
his firm belief in the universal dignity of the human person-
ality. We quickly pass over Justice Murphy's military ser-
vice in World War I, although it is possible that his military
experience then, plus his later army service in 1940, played
a part in establishing his strong conviction concerning the
supremacy of the civil authority over the military. At least
5 A thinly concealed dislike for Justice Murphy pervaded the editorial of a
local paper. South Bend Trib., July 20, 1949, p. -8, col. 2. Its undisguised relief
that there was one less 'iberal" on the Court prompted this writer to a reply,
which was published therein. South Bend Trib., July 23, 1949, p. 4, col. 7.
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it is interesting to note that the Roosevelt appointee with
the most military service was the most adamant in resisting
military encroachment of civil jurisdiction.
However, it is with his service as a judge of the municipal
court of Detroit that we begin to find unmistakable evidence
of the humanitarian philosophy which he was later to bring
with him to the Supreme Court. In the trial of Dr. Ossian
Sweet and his family (Negroes) for murder of a ruffian
member of a white mob which had attempted to break in
and destroy the house which the -defendants had purchased
in what had been regarded as a "white" neighborhood,
Frank Murphy was the presiding judge. His conduct of
that trial, in a courtroom pulsating with unmasked racial
hatred and ominous with threats of possible violence, led
Walter White to remark: "Never had a trial been conducted
with mote scrupulous fairness than it was by Judge Frank
Murphy...." 6
Thus, early in his career, and on the comparatively ob-
scure level of the municipal bench, Murphy was already
demonstrating his scrupulous concern for the substantive
and procedural rights of minority groups, especially those
who were the objects of deep prejudice and the victims of
the oppressions and social passions of a temporary majority,
or an alleged "anthropological elite." With his rapid ascen-
sion into high places and great councils, that feeling for
oppressed minorities was to grow in intensity and in the
eloquence of expression through which it was publicly mani-
fested.
Another interesting period in the pre-Supreme Court
career of Justice Murphy was the term he served as Gover-
nor-General and first High-Commissioner of the Philippines.
In that role he was called upon to guide the people of the
Philippines through the birth pangs of their newly acquired
semi-independence. His gentle understanding of 'the prob-
6 WHn, A MW CMLm Wnrz 77 (1948).
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lems to be faced during this transition from a semi-backward
colony to the beginnings of an independent state, earned for
him the respect and affection of that people, and prompted
the present Philippine Ambassador to the United States to
comment, upon learning of Justice Murphy's death, that he
was "one of the most highly respected and best-loved Ameri-
cans ever to serve" in the islands.1
We can only surmise that Justice Murphy's experience
in the Philippines helped to fashion the broad, ecumenical
attitude displayed on the bench toward aliens and foreign
petitioners for judicial redress, even if they were the hated
generals of our defeated enemies.8 Frank Murphy was no
parochialist; and it seems certain that his tenure in the
Philippines contributed in a good measure to his firm belief
in the universality with which justice should be dispensed.
Recalled by President Roosevelt to run for Governor in
the crucial state of Michigan, Frank Murphy was elected
and served one term. It was during this time that he first
received great national publicity, for it was his destiny to
serve as Governor during the days of the crucial "sit-down"
strikes in the automobile industry. It was at this time that
he displayed a humanitarianism which refused to indorse
the use of violence, the bayonet, tear-gas, and death in order
to demonstrate the undeniable property rights of the Gen-
eral Motors Corporation. Firmly refusing force, he used
persuasion to induce the "sit-down" strikers to leave the
plants and finally settle the strike. It was a courageous
decision. In making it he brought down upon his head an
avalanche of diatribe from the conservative press and those
who would place the abstraction of "property rights" over
and above the human issues involved in a tense and danger-
7 N.Y. Times, July 20, 1949, p. 26, col. 2.
8 See, e.g., his dissent in Application of Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1, 66 S. Ct.
340, 90 L. Ed. 499 (1946). In addition, justice Murphy was the sole dissenter
in the Court's refusal to interfere with the execution of the Japanese war criminals
by the Tokyo Tribunal. However, he wrote no dissenting opinion. Kido v. Mac-
Arthur, 335 U. S. 906, 69 S. Ct. 197 (1949).
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ous situation. It perhaps cost him his re-election as Gov-
ernor, but if the auto workers needed to be taught a lesson
that lesson did not need to be written in blood.9 He thus
placed principle above political advantage in a brave display
of his humane philosophy in which the dry formalisms of
a legal "right" were not allowed to obfuscate the funda-
mental moral and human values at stake. From this philoso-
phy he never departed and, as examination of his judicial
opinions will reveal, it was one of Justice Murphy's out-
standing traits. Like St. Paul he believed in the maxim:
"The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life." The sit-down
strike affair was thus the first real public demonstration of
the sincere understanding with which Justice Murphy was
to view the problems of labor and which was later to reveal
itself in the pages of his opinions.
After his defeat for re-election as Governor of Michigan,
President Roosevelt appointed Murphy as Attorney General
of the United States. While in that office he successfully
presented charges of graft and corruption against the in-
famous Pendergast machine in Kansas City. He was suc-
cessful also in securing the conviction of Federal Circuit
Court Judge Manton for "selling" justice. In addition, he
supported to the full the efforts of his able assistant attorney
general, Thurman Arnold, in his many famous anti-trust
suits. However, illustrative as these events are in revealing
Justice Murphy's distaste for political corruption and eco-
nomic monopoly, his proudest achievement as Attorney Gen-
eral was the creation of a Civil Rights Section in the Depart-
ment of Justice."0 In his annual report for 1939, Murphy
referred to this activity in the following statement: 11
9 Doris Fleeson comments: "During tense weeks, by sheer moral force, he
held willful men in conference-John L. Lewis, who has. built an enduring union
on the blood of martyrs, and attorneys for General Motors, one a du Pont son-
in-law, who knew the strike was legally wrong and thought that a show of vio-
lence would put the public on their side. Few politicians have the intestinal
fortitude to outlast such men." Chi. Daily News, July 23, 1949, p. 5, col. 3.
10 KoNvnz, TE CoNsT.ETrnox AND CrVIL RIGHTS 64 (1947). It is unfor-
tunate that his successors have adopted a policy of self-limitation on the Justice
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The maintenance of civil liberties of the individual is one
of the mainstays and bulwarks of democracy. It is funda-
mental that in the United States certain civil rights are guar-
anteed by the state governments, while others are assured by
the Federal Government. In respect to the latter group the
Department of Justice has an important function to perform.
With that end in view, I caused to be organized a Civil
Liberties Unit in the Criminal Division of the Department.
One of the functions of this unit is to study complaints of
violations of the Civil Rights Act and to supervise prosecu-
tions under those statutes.
This concrete manifestation of the responsibility which
Murphy felt the Federal Government owed to its citizens in
the protection of their civil rights brought many apprecia-
tive acknowledgements and honors from various minority
groups.12 But more important, this manifestation serves to
indicate that the judicial preference for human rights over
"states' rights," which Murphy later exhibited on the bench,
was part of the core of his philosophy of life, and not a con-
clusion first drawn in the Olympian detachment of his Su-
preme Court office. If further evidence of Justice Murphy's
pre-judicial convictions on the point are needed, we can
recall the words of one of his speeches wherein he said:1
... this task of protecting civil liberties [is] ... made twice
burdensome by the fact that there is little pleasure in enforc-
ing liberty for those who would deny liberty to others if they
were in power. It is not easy to detest an extremist philosophy
and yet insist on the right of a man to advocate it freely.
Yet, apparently we must do just this if we are to practice our
faith in democracy... We must never forget that the demo-
cratic way is not to crush the alien view but to let it be heard
and to defeat it by demonstrating that our way of living con-
tributes the most to human happiness.
Department which has left the Civil Rights Section at the point of impotency.
Id. at 65.
11 REP. AT'Y GEN. 2 (1939). See also, P=rTca'TT, Tim RoSVELT CotrT
149 (1948); Scanlan, Book Review, 24 NoTR DAmm LAwYEa 142 (1948).
12 WHrrF, op. cit. supra note 6, at 175.
13 Speech delivered over N.B.C., March 27, 1939, as quoted by Barnett,
Mr. Justice Murphy, Civil Liberties and the Holmes Tradition, 32 CoRe. L. Q.
177, 181 (1946).
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What confidence in, and understanding of, the democratic
process those words reveal! Democracy can only triumph
by accenting the affirmative moral worth of its own attrac-
tive ideal; when it descends to the level of its totalitarian
seducers, it risks its own suicide. Frank Murphy knew that,
and, as we shall see, kept it always in mind during his tenure
on the Supreme Court.
Thus, on the eve of his appointment to the Supreme Court,
the events, deeds, and utterances in which he had partici-
pated up to that time would seem to entitle us to say that
Justice Murphy was affected with a deep passion for the
freedom of the individual, and that he possessed an acute
sensitivity in his solicitude for the legal rights of unpopular
minorities. Moreover, he seemed to accept the community
of man and the universality of human nature. But above
all, he appeared to be a man to whom the law was a concept
second in importance to justice. Just what he conceived to
be the permissible scope and function of the governmental
power in the non-civil liberties fields, such as government
regulation of business activity, perhaps we could not appraise
too confidently. However, in at least one public utterance
he indicated his personal realization that in the evolving
industrial economy of our day, the power of government is
not to be restricted to a limited and negative public power,
but must be used positively as an instrument for human
betterment.1 4 Indeed, even before his elevation to the
Supreme Court, Murphy had made public his opinion that: 5
. . . the whole people shall enjoy equal opportunity for eco-
nomic security and the immeasurable benefits of civil and
political freedom.
However, the real story of Frank Murphy lies in the
evaluation of his judicial work as a member of the Supreme
Court of the United States from 1940 to 1949. To sum-
14 N. Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1940, p. 10, col. 2.
15 Murphy, The Courts-A National Bulwark, 5 VrrAL SpzEcHas op TH DAY
435, 436 (1939).
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marize at the outset some of the characteristics which he
demonstrated while serving as Associate Justice, we must
say that he was a hard working judge, ranking second only
to Justices Black and Douglas in the production of written
opinions."8 As might have been expected, he specialized,
in a sense, in writing the opinions in civil liberty cases and
cases arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the
Fair Labor Standards Act, and similar statutes enacted in
response to the growing demand for a minimum of economic
security for the American worker. Political freedom and
economic security were two themes which could always in-
terest Frank Murphy. It must be admitted, however, that
the intensity of his feeling, especially in civil liberty cases,
sometimes resulted in opinions which were, in a large meas-
ure, appeals to emotion.17 However, his offenses in this re-
gard, if indeed they were offenses, were the sins of the warm-
hearted, and -the emotions appealed to were always noble
ones. To be -a conscience, even of our highest judicial body,
one must be permitted occasional resort to emotion and in-
tuition with which to make more appetizing the often dry
provender of logic. As Murphy himself put it, "as a judge
I have no loftier duty or responsibility than to uphold ...
spiritual freedom to its farthest reaches." 18 Such a function
could not adequately be executed if confined -to the some-
times limited and arid instruments of precedent and logic.
Murphy's position in the alignment of the Court on various
issues is not hard to point out. He was part of -the liberal
wing composed of Justices Black, Douglas, the late Justice
16 Frank, The United States Supreme Court 1948-1949, 16 U. or Cnx. L. REv.
1 (1948).
17 See, e.g., his opinion in Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 65 S. Ct. 1443,
89 L. Ed. 2103 (1945). Professor Pritchett comments that Justice Murphy's
hypersensitive concern sometimes led him into "ventures little short of quixotic."
PaRrc=nr, op. dt. supra note 11, at 285.
18 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 63
S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1600 (1943).
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Rutledge, " and himself. This wing of the Court accepted,
along with the conservative wing headed by Justices Frank-
furter, Jackson, Burton, and Chief Justice Vinson, the
Holtnesian concept of the proper function of the judge, i.e.,
that a judge should not substitute his concepts of public
policy for that embodied in the collective mandate of the
representatives of -the people, and thus be led to frequent
and unjustifiable rulings in favor of the unconstitutionality
of statutes. Unlike the conservative wing, however, the
Black, Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge alignment did not carry
over this attitude of judicial "self-restraint," but on the
contrary became very "activistic," when examining state or
national action which injected itself into the field of civil
liberties."0 Leaving aside the merits of this difference of
judicial approach for a while, we can say 'that Justice Mur-
phy was the most firm of the liberal four in his adherence
to their mixed philosophy of judicial "activism" and judicial
"self-restraint." His record in upholding civil liberties since
1941 was one hundred per cent, while his support of the
Government's power to regulate business activity was as
regular as -that of his -three liberal brothers, and, in addition,
his pro-labor position has been characterized as "the most
extreme on the Court." 21
Having identified Justice Murphy as the left wing member
of the liberal branch of the Court, it should be fruitful to
examine in more detail the application of his philosophy to
the specific types of constitutional questions which have
been presented to the Court for decision. Since the writer
19 Justice Rutledge died not long after justice Murphy. He passed away on
September 10, 1949. His loss to the Court and to the country was great indeed.
The writer is profoundly sorry that the limitations of time and space do not
permit further eulogy of that great judge.
20 Schlesinger, The Supreme Cout: 1947, Fortune, January, 1947, p. 73.
Professor Schlesinger, loyal Harvard man that he is, gives the Frankfurter view a
bit the best of it. When he calls the latter "a beloved teacher," he gives himself
away. Felix Frankfurter was a great teacher. Whether he was "beloved' is
another story.
21 PRzrC H T, op. cit. supra note 11, at 259. See also, Curis, LioNs UNm
TE THRoNE 204 (1947).
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has asserted, and it has been conceded in many quarters,
that Murphy was -the "conscience of the Court" on matters
of civil liberties, more extended discussions of that phase
of Justice Murphy's judicial career should be permissible.
We have commented earlier on the paradox demonstrated
by the liberal wing of the Court in being judicially "self-
restrained," save on matters of civil liberty where, in direct
contradiction, they became very cautious and inquisitive in
passing upon the constitutionality of governmental action
which might jeopardize the fundamental political freedoms
of -the citizen. One author has labeled this phenomenon as
the "paradox in the Holmes tradition," 2 since Justice
Holmes had demonstrated the same apparent lack of con-
sistency in dealing with questions of personal liberty, as
opposed to those involving the constitutionality of legis-
lative regulation of economic activities.
Correctly appraised the paradox is easy to resolve, and
the judges who adhere to it, like Murphy and Holmes, must
be absolved of inconsistency. After all, when judges refuse
to substitute their concepts of public policy for those of the
people by promiscuously overturning duly enacted measures
of the state or national legislatures, they are assuming that
the 'legislature, the body composed of the elected represen-
tatives of the people, is entitled to govern according to the
rules of democracy. However, when those same represen-
tatives of the majority pass legislation which attempts to
restrict minority groups in the exercise of their rights, they
are cutting at the basic root of democratic government,
which is nothing else than the right to dissent. 8 We defer
to legislative supremacy only because we assume they have
proved their right to it by their victory in the competitive
market place of contesting political theories, parties, and
22 Barnett, Mr. Justice Murphy, Civil Liberties and the Holmes Tradition,
32 CoR . L. Q. 177 (1946).
28 SPITz, PATTERNS Or ANTI-DEmOCRATIC THOUGHT 6 (1949). See also, for
an excellent book review of this stimulating work, Saturday Review of Literature,
July 16, 1949, p. 13.
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groups. When they curtail or restrict the competitive nature
of the arena of the political struggle by attempted restraints
on free speech, press, assembly, or the practice of religion,
they erase the major premise of democratic government from
which all else flows. Some have said that this special judicial
safeguarding of our civil liberties and the political rights
embraced in the Bill of Rights is an aristocratic, as opposed
to a democratic, function.2" Correctly understood, it seems
valid to say that it is -the sine qua non of democracy to pro-
tect the free competition of ideas, lest in restricting that we
forfeit all.
Justice Murphy was possessed of that philosophy. He was
willing to afford a wide scope to federal and state powers of
regulation. In the American Power and Light case,25 involv-
ing the question of the constitutionality of the "death sen-
tence" provision of the Public Utility Holding Company Act,
he indicated the permissible sweep of at least one important
federal power when he said: ". .. the federal commerce
power is as broad as the economic needs of the nation." 26
Moreover, like his colleagues Black and Douglas, Justice
Murphy took a tolerant attitude in regard to state taxation
and regulation of economic enterprise, and usually could be
found siding with those Justices who would sustain state
action along these lines."' But while Murphy was willing
to give the Commerce Clause "the most liberal interpreta-
tion.., since John Marshall," 28 and while, along with Jus-
tice Black, he was a "complete and consistent supporter of
24 See VER=c, CONSERvATIrm REVISITE (1949). The eminent poet, Mr.
Viereck, is not disapproving of this hyper-solicitude for the Bill of Rights. He
merely is using the word aristocratic in a broader sense than is usually afforded
it-that is, in the sense of preserving and conserving political freedom rather than
economic and financial power.
25 American Power and Light Co. v. S. E. C., 329 U. S. 90, 67 S. Ct. 133,
91 L. Ed. 103 (1946).
26 329 U. S. at 104,
27 PRaicnnr, op. cit. supra note 11, at 89.
28 New Republic, August 1, 1949, p. 5, col. 1.
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state power," 19 nevertheless, his devotion to the canon of
legislative supremacy did not unduly influence him in his
approach to the problem of civil -liberties. As has been said
of Holmes, Justice Murphy believed that there were:"
... some manifestations of the human spirit . .. so precious
that in specific instances he found no justification for legis-
lative restrictions, tolerant though he was of the legislative
judgment.
Justice Murphy balked when the power of regulation was
the thinly concealed disguise for the hand of oppression.
For instance, to Frank Murphy, unrestricted freedom of
speech and press was of paramount importance in the hier-
archy of constitutional values. He recognized that the way
to refute noxious doctrines is to expose them and argue them
down. In that way only can we preserve unimpaired the
avenues of thought-exchange which are the necessary sinews
of the democratic state. Thus he supported the doctrine that
peaceful picketing was free speech; 3 that a semi-Fascist,
defrocked priest had the right to utter his diatribes of racial
hatred in the face of a hostile crowd; 2 that newspaper edi-
tors are not to be found guilty of contempt for articles criti-
cal of a court;13 that unions are not to be prohibited from
supporting candidates for election via the medium of the
press and the pamphlet. 4 There are other less extreme ex-
amples of Murphy's devotion to the principle of free speech
and of a free press. All illustrate his unshakeable faith that
democracy is built upon the full and peaceful interchange
of competing ideas. To allow freedom even for speech that
29 FRAwK, MR. JUSTIcE BLACK: The Man and His Opinions 154 (1949);
see also, Scanlan, Book Review, 25 No-ran DAlm LAWYvR .... (1949).
30 FRANxKuRTER, MR. JusTicE HoLmES AND = SuPREmm Couar 49 (1938).
It is interesting to note that this comment is made of his hero by Justice Frank-
furter, and yet -the gentleman often forgets that same creed in his rigid adherence
to the doctrine of legislative supremacy, even if it means intrusion into the broad
sphere of civil liberties.
31 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1940).
32 Terminiello v. Chicago, - U. S ....-6 9 S. Ct. 894 (1949); see also,
Rodell, Freedom For Speech We Loathe, The Progressive, July 1949, p. 9, col. 2.
33 Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, 67 S. Ct. 1249, 91 L. Ed. 1546 (1947).
34 United States v. C.I.O., 335 U. S. 106, 68 S. Ct. 1349, 92 L. Ed. 1849 (1948).
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is loathsome to us is the true test of the sincerity of our
democratic convictions. Justice Murphy met that test.
This faith in the competition of ideas as the indispen-
sable cornerstone of our democracy was exemplified by
Justice Murphy when he approached the problem of legis-
lative action and the constitutional principle of freedom of
religion. Frank Murphy had enough faith in his religion
and in Christianity in general, to know that it could with-
stand the challenge of error, heresy, and totalitarian slav-
ery. Truth in religion, like democracy in politics, will pre-
vail in the market place of -ideas, unless its defenders forfeit
it by the failure to stand up and speak for it, or take the
equally fatal alternative of persecuting those who challenge
it. In the blood of martyrs grows the seed of a church, be
it Christian or Communist. Frank Murphy was not one to
forget it. In a concurring opinion in Martin v. Strutkers,85
wherein the Court struck down a city ordinance which made
it unlawful for anyone distributing literature to ring a door-
bell or knock on a door, he said:8"
I believe that nothing enjoys a higher estate in our society
than the right given by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments freely to practice and proclaim one's religious convic-
tions... The right extends to the aggressive and disputatious
as well as to the meek and acquiescent. The lesson of experi-
ence is that-with the passage of time and the interchange
of ideas-organizations, once turbulent, perfervid and intol-
erant in their origin, mellow into tolerance and acceptance by
the community, or else sink into oblivion.
Thus, Justice Murphy, himself a deeply religious and
pious man, never lost his patient tolerance even of the most
bitter attackers of his own faith, such as were -the Jehovah's
Witnesses, whose right to speak, practice, and propagan-
dize their unorthodox religion he defended to the last.87
85 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 63 S. Ct. 862, 87 L. Ed.
1313 (1943).
86 319 U. S. at 149.
87 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 64 S. Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed.
645 (1944). In a lone dissent Justice Murphy condemned a statute which made
it a misdemeanor for an adult to permit a child to sell religious literature. An
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His religion was deep enough, his faith strong enough to
tolerate and protect the opponents of that faith. He under-
stood that Catholicism, and Christianity in general, have
withstood the vicissitudes of time and events not because
they were the popularly held beliefs of strong, but -tem-
porary majorities, but because, possessing the hard kernel
of Divine Truth, the bleatings of the harmless fanatics or
the terrifying blows of the determined totalitarian enslavers
of Man and Nature, fell equally impotent against an in-
destructible idea. With such a philosophy it is easy to see
why Justice Murphy could not approve legislation which
prevented people from ringing door bells in the sincere
propagation of their religious views; or legislation which
taxed the sale of religious literature; or which forced chil-
dren to salute a flag when -their view of God told them
not to; or which required a license for the distribution of
religious reading matter. Neither could a man of such con-
victions feel compelled to object when a majority of his
brothers on the Court said the First Amendment prevents
the teaching of religion in public schools on school time.8"
Perhaps, in the latter case, Frank Murphy knew in his
heart that the truant officer never can be an adequate sub-
stitute for the spirit of the Lord. We may not approve of
the McCollum decision, but it shouldn't be hard to trace
the premises on which Frank Murphy's assent to it rested.
It is not surprising, in view of Justice Murphy's faith
that Christianity and democracy will prevail by the sheer,
inexorable force of their own truth and virtues, that he
became the special protector of various minority groups
whose views and status have, from time to time, incurred
the oppressive condemnation of a temporary majority. We
have mentioned his special solicitude for the vexatious
extreme position-nevetheless, it is another example of Justice Murphy's passion-
ate regard for religious liberty.
88 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 68 S. Ct. 461, 92 L. Ed.
649 (1948).
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Jehovah's Witnesses. Equally the objects of his judicial
custody were American Negroes. His defense of their rights
flowed from his faith in democracy, of course. But even
more catalytic here was his concept of the equality of
human dignity as the basis of our Christian civilization.
Thus, he dissented from the majority holding in Akins v.
Texas 9 that the intentional limitation of one Negro to a
jury satisfied the requirements of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. He disagreed also from the holding in Screws v.
United States° which limited the criminal provisions of
the federal civil rights laws. He saw clearly that -the seman-
tically appealing slogan of "states' rights" was too often
used as a facade behind which "human rights" were ob-
literated. Deference to the legislative will of a geographical
minority is misplaced when it violates the letter and spirit
of the fundamental law of the national majority-the Con-
stitution. As he himself put it:4
Too often unpopular minorities, such as Negroes, are unable
to find effective refuge from the cruelties of bigoted and ruth-
less authority. States are undoubtedly capable of punishing
their officers who commit such outrages. But where, as here,
the states are unwilling for some reason to prosecute such
crimes the federal government must step in unless constitu-
tional guarantees are to become atrophied.
We mentioned before the fact that Justice Murphy usu-
ally lent a sympathetic ear when labor's right to 'organize
or bargain collectively was the issue before the Court. Yet
even here, when labor unions also attempted to discrim-
inate, Murphy was quick to challenge them. His pro-labor
bias did not lead him into the hypocrisy of sanctioning
racial bigotry. So, in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. R.
Co.,42 he concurred in a unanimous opinion of the Supreme
Court which struck down attempts by the Railroad Brother-
39 Aklns v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 65 S. Ct. 1276, 89 L. Ed. 1692 (1945).
40 Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 65 S. Ct. 1031, 89 L. Ed. 1495 (1945).
41 325 U. S. at 138.
42 Steele v. Louisville and Nashville R. R., 323 U. S. 192, 65 S. Ct. 226,
89 L. Ed. 173 (1944).
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hood to exclude Negroes. The Court held that the union,
the exclusive bargaining agent under the Railway Labor
Act, must represent all members of the trade or craft with-
out hostile discrimination. Justice Murphy was not con-
tent to rest the decision, as the remainder of the Justices
did, on grounds of statutory interpretation alone, .but went
further in a reminder that grave constitutional issues were
raised, saying:4"
The Constitution voices its disapproval whenever economic
discrimination is applied under authority of law against any
race, creed or color. A sound democracy cannot allow such
discrimination to go unchallenged. Racism is far too virulent
today to permit the slightest refusal, in the light of a Con-
stitution that abhors it, to expose and condemn it wherever
it appears in the course of a statutory interpretation.
An appeal to the emotions? Perhaps the emotionalism,
let us say, of a man whose democratic instincts flowed from
the deep wells of his Christianity. When we remember that
discrimination against the civil liberties or the economic op-
portunities of any legitimate minority is the opening wedge
against liberty itself, we can discern the hard substance of
long range logic and reason deep in the bottom of the cup
of emotionalism that Frank Murphy often raised.
One further indication of Justice Murphy's proclivity
for piercing the protective veil of arid legalisms, when on
the trail of those who would restrict the American Negro
to the status of the "half-citizen," can be found in the sec-
ond Sipuel case.4 Here the Supreme Court held that by
ordering the regents to admit a qualified Negro applicant
to the University of Oklahoma Law School where she was
to remain until a separate law school was established and
ready to function, the Oklahoma county court did not de-
part from the Supreme Court's mandate in the first Sipuel
case," wherein it had been decided that a Negro applicant
43 323 U. S. at 209.
44 Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U. S. 147, 68 S. Ct. 389, 92 L. Ed. 604 (1948).
45 Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 332 U. S. 631,
68 S. Ct. 299, 92 L. Ed. 247 (1948).
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to a professional school could not be discriminated against
and denied admission solely because of color. Frank Mur-
phy joined informally with his close colleague, the late
Justice Rutledge, in a dissent which indicated that had
both lived, further judicial perpetrations of the fallacious
"separate but equal" maxim would have had at -least two
dissenters. When that fantastic fiction is finally wiped
away,46 Justice Murphy's spirit will, perhaps, rest easier.
No picture of Justice Murphy's deep concern overCracism." as a debilitating factor in the moral structure of
our society could be complete without mentioning his defense
of the much persecuted Japanese-American groups. For in-
stance, while he concurred reluctantly in Hirabayasi v.
United States,47 upholding the Army curfew order applicable
to all Americans of Japanese ancestry, he publicly pro-
claimed the prickings of his sensitive conscience and the
uneasy apprehensions that must have possessed him, when
he said: 48
Today is the first time, so far as I am aware, that we have
sustained a substantial restriction of the personal liberty of
citizens of the United States based upon the accident of race
or ancestry. Under the curfew order here challenged no less
than 70,000 American citizens have been placed under a special
ban and deprived of their liberty because of their particular
racial inheritance. In this sense it bears a melancholy re-
semblance to the treatment accorded to members of the Jewish
race in Germany and in other parts of Europe. The result is
the creation in this country of two classes of citizens for the
purposes of a critical and perilous hour-to sanction discrim-
ination between groups of United States citizens on the basis
of ancestry. In my opinion, this goes to the very brink of
constitutional power.
46 For the true picture of how what is sometimes termed as constitutionally
"separate but equal" proves to be sociologically, economically, professionally, and
realistically "separate but grossly unequal," see SpIrGLE, IN = LAND OF Jim
CROW 50-55 (1949).
47 irabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 63 S. Ct. 1375, 87 L. Ed.
1774 (1943).
48 320U. S. at 111.
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Nor was it long before Justice Murphy's voice was again
raised against the Court's relaxation of its vigilance toward
executive and legislative action which might advance the
ugly curse of racism. In Korematsu v. United States,4"
when the majority of the Court sustained the Army evacua-
tion and exclusion order barring Japanese-Americans from
the West Coast, Justice Murphy refused to go further along
a road that very well might terminate in the twin disasters
of military supremacy over civil authority and constitution-
ally permitted discrimination against any minority group,
racial or religious, who might be the particular objects of
hate of some future majority. Justice Murphy said that the
order was not based on any demonstrated need, but upon:50
... an accumulation of much of the misinformation, half-
truths and insinuations that for years have been directed
against Japanese Americans by people with racial and eco-
nomic prejudices....
The Court, in his opinion, had exceeded the "brink of
constitutional power" and had fallen into the very ugly
abyss of racism. While subsequent liberal and courageous
decisions, such as the racial restrictive covenant rulings,
51
have perhaps softened the fear in some quarters that the
Court was tolerating damaging intrusions in the field of civil
liberties, nevertheless, the chilling words of Justice Murphy's
dissent in the Korematsu case should not be forgotten.
Further evidence of Justice Murphy's protective attitude
toward minorities who are the unpopular targets of the
transitory majority appears from examination of cases in-
volving the rights of aliens. For instance, he took up the
cause of the Japanese alien in Oyama v. Californda,5" where-
49 323 U. S. 214, 65 S. Ct. 193, 89 L. Ed. 194 (1944).
50 323 U. S. at 231.
51 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161 (1948), and
Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24, 68 S. Ct. 847, 92 L. Ed. 1187 (1948). This writer,
among many others, has discussed these cases. Scanlan, Racial Restrictions in Real
Estate-Property Values Versus Human Values, 24 NOTRE DAMe LAwVYRa 157
(1949).
52 332 U. S. 633, 68 S. Ct. 269, 92 L. Ed. 249 (1948).
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in the Court struck down as unconstitutional a prima fade
presumption under the California Alien Land Law that con-
veyances of title, where the.consideration was paid by the
agent ineligible for citizenship, were not gifts but were for
the benefit of the alien. While the majority was content
only to outlaw the presumption under the statute, Justice
Murphy, along with Justice Rutledge, condemned the statute
as outright racial discrimination and unconstitutional. Jus-
tice Murphy also raised the novel point that our interna-
tional obligations were involved:53
And so in origin, purpose, administration and effect, the
Alien Land Law does violence to the high ideals of the Con-
stitution of the United States and the Charter of the United
Nations. It is an unhappy facsimile, a disheartening re-
minder, ofthe racial policy pursued by those forces of evil
whose destruction recently necessitated a devastating war. It
is racism in one of its most malignant forms.
Again in Takakashi v. Fish and Game Commission,54 Jus-
tice Murphy went further than the majority in outlawing a
California statute which denied fishing licenses to persons
ineligible for citizenship, condemning it as discriminatory
in intent as well as in effect.
Murphy's phobia for protection of minority rights carried
over into other fields. In passing, we can recall his refusal
to compound the attenuated judicial interpretations of the
Mann Act to embrace unfortunate members of the Mormon
sect that -ran afoul of that congressional attempt to "purify
interstate commerce." " Even more fundamental are his
views toward unpopular political minorities, even those of
the totalitarian mold. He wrote an opinion in the Bridges
case,56 wherein the Court refused to permit the deportation
of the alien labor leader, Harry Bridges, for alleged member-
ship in the Communist party. This opinion went further than
the majority holding, which merely had decided the case on
58 332 U. S. at 673.
54 334 U. S. 410, 422, 68 S. Ct. 1138, 92 L. Ed. 1478 (1948).
55 Cleveland v. United States, 329 U. S. 14, 67 S. Ct. 13,91 L. Ed. 13 (1946).
56 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 65 S. Ct. 1443, 89 L. Ed. 2103 (1945).
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the grounds that the evidence of Bridges' affiliation with the
Communist party was unsatisfactory. Murphy felt that the
deportation statute was unconstitutional in denying due
process and abridging the First Amendment. Extreme con-
clusions-yes; but the hysteria of a "witch-hunt" is extreme
in its own good measure, and could violently provoke the
democratic serenity of Murphy's philosophy.
Again, in Schneiderman v. United States," Justice Mur-
phy was vigorous in his defense of what he regarded as the
political liberty of even an alien. In this denaturalization
case, based on the charge that Schneiderman had been a
Communist at the time of his admission to this country,
Murphy pointed out that this was a proceeding to revoke
citizenship after twelve years, and that the burden of proof
was on the Government to prove the case "by... evidence
which does not leave the issue in doubt." 58 In other words,
he would impose a test which is apparently identical with
that of criminal law where a man's guilt must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. When we recall that the loss to
liberty, property, and economic and social opportunities is
often equally as great in the case of deportation as in many
criminal convictions, the similarity of the tests is not un-
justifiable.
Recent evidence of Justice Murphy's defense of political
minorities occurred in MacDougal v. Green 11 where the
Court refused to strike down an Illinois election statute
which required that a certain number of signatures on an
election petition be from at least fifty different counties.
The majority denied the "equal protection of the laws" argu-
ment of the petitioner, candidate for Governor of the State
of llinois on the ticket of Henry Wallace's Progressive
Party. Justice Murphy joined Justices Douglas and Black
in dissent as they pointed out the fact that merely because
57 320 U. S. 118, 63 S. Ct. 1333, 87 L. Ed. 1796 (1943).
58 320 U. S. at 135.
59 335 U. S. 281, 69 S. Ct. 1 (1948).
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the federal Constitution sanctions some political dispropor-
tionate representation, there was no justification for allowing
the states to create additional ones.6 °
Departing from consideration of Justice Murphy and the
problem of minority protection, and turning to the field of
criminal law and procedure, we find a similar concern for
individual rights exhibited by the Justice when appraising
the fairness of criminal proceedings. And it is not surprising
that one who was quick to preserve the rights of political,
social, or religious dissenters and non-conformists should
also demonstrate a solicitude for. the rights of criminals.
After all, fair procedure in a criminal trial is one of the essen-
tial features of the Bill of Rights. Its place in the tradition
and political history of our nation is so well known that
comment on it is unnecessary. Add to that the recent use
by police states of the criminal law as a cruel and effective
instrument for ferreting out and crushing the spirit of demo-
cratic opposition, and we can rejoice and applaud when our
courts and judges go to extreme lengths in demanding fair
criminal procedure, whether in the station house or in the
court house.
Fundamental, of course, in ensuring fairness of trial in
the criminal proceeding is the necessity of a democratic jury
system. We find that Justice Murphy gave his assent to this
proposition on several occasions. In Fay v. New York "
he dissented from a majority holding which sanctioned a
New York "blue ribbon" jury panel under which women and
laboring people were systematically excluded. In his dissent
he decried a standard of jury selection which was "apparent-
ly of an economic or social nature, unjustified by the demo-
cratic principles of the jury system." 62
Turning to other phases of criminal law, we can point out
additional examples of Justice Murphy's firmness in resisting
60 69 S. Ct. at 4.
61 332 U. S. 261, 67 S. Ct. 1613, 91 L. Ed. 2043 (1947).
62 332 U. S. at 299.
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the slightest possible encroachment on the Anglo-Saxon ideal
of fair criminal procedure. In a dissent in Adams v.
McCann " he refused to recognize an accused's right to
waive a jury trial in a federal court. In Trupiano v. United
States6 4 he joined the majority in giving a broad, protective
interpretation to the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure. He argued similarly in a
dissenting opinion in Harris v. United States,65 and again in
Wolf v. Colorado.66 Moreover, it is interesting to note that,
while Murphy deferred usually to administrative "exper-
tise" when petitioners raised the claim of administrative
action beyond the scope of their statutory authority,6" never-
theless, when the administrative action seemed to him to
have invaded the broad sphere of the Fourth Amendment,
a different answer was reached. Thus, in Oklahoma Press
Publishing Company v. Walling,6" he dissented from a major-
ity ruling that the Fair Labor Standards Act Administrator
had the authority to issue subpoenas for the production of
a newspaper's books and records. Justice Murphy's great
concern for civil liberties could not permit him to sanction
the use of non-judicial subpoenas by administrative agents.
Other incidental manifestations of Justice Murphy's devo-
tion to the ideal of fair criminal procedure are found in his
dissent in Malinski v. New York,69 where he attacked the
use of the third degree. His condemnation of wire-tapping
was vigorous, as we see in Goldman v. United States;7" his
habit of strictly construing penal statutes is illustrated in
Chatwin v. United States,71 where he construed the "Lind-
68 317 U. S. 269, 63 S. Ct. 236, 87 L. Ed. 268 (1942).
64 334 U. S. 699, 68 S. Ct. 1229, 92 L. Ed. 1673 (1948).
65 331 U. S. 145, 67 S. Ct. 1098, 91 L. Ed. 1399 (1947).
66 .... U. S ..... 69 S. Ct. 1359 (1949).
67 See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 67 S. Ct. 1575, 91 L. Ed.
1995 (1947).
68 327 U. S. 186, 66 S. Ct. 494, 90 L. Ed. 614 (1946).
69 324 U. S. 401, 65 S. Ct. 781, 89 L. Ed. 1029 (1945).
70 316 U. S. 129, 62 S. Ct. 993, 86 L. Ed. 1322 (1942).
71 326 U. S. 455, 66 S. Ct. 233, 90 L. Ed. 198 (1945).
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bergh" federal kidnapping law narrowly so as not to have it
encompass Mormons, who had taken a young girl without
the consent of her parents across state lines for the purposes
of a "celestial" marriage. Moreover, in refusing to apply the
Mann Act to voluntary prostitution within the District 'of
Columbia, he once again indicated his firm resistance to the
extension of a general federal power to the point where local
"affairs" became interstate crimes."2
One final important case must be appraised before con-
cluding the examination of Justice Murphy's concept of the
relationship of the Bill of Rights and American criminal law.
In Adamson v. California,73 a five-Justice majority sustained
a California statute which permitted comment by the prose-
cution upon the accused's failure to explain or deny the
evidence against him. They felt that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not embrace the self-incrimination provisions of
the Fifth Amendment. Justice Murphy, with the remaining
three judges, felt otherwise, and was of the opinion that all
of the guarantees found in the Bill of Rights applied against
the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact,
Justice Murphy, along with Justice Rutledge, wanted to go
even further and, in addition to carrying -over "the specific
guarantees of the Bill of Rights" and applying them to the
states via the Fourteenth Amendment, foresaw that: 74
Occasions may arise where a proceeding falls so far short of
conforming to fundamental standards of procedure as to
warrant constitutional condemnation in terms of a lack of due
process despite the absence of a specific provision in the Bill
of Rights.
A judge with Murphy's heedfulness of fair procedure is
led inexorably to the conclusion that a double standard Bill
of Rights is an anachronism in this democratic day. If the
standards of restraint upon the powers of government in
this area are valid when applied to the Federal Government,
72 United States v. Beach, 324 U. S. 193, 69 S. Ct. 602, 89 L. Ea, 865 (1944).
73 332 U. S. 46, 67 S. Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947).
74 332 U. S. at 124.
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they should be equally mandatory when reviewing trans-
gressions of fair criminal procedure on the part of the states.
Not only logic, but the legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment re-enforce that judgment.75 However, it must
be admitted that Justice Murphy's desire to build even fur-
ther on this base, while understandable from humanitarian
considerations, would present further uncertainty and a
greater possibility of a wave of certiorari petitions which
would consume precious time which the Court can ill afford
to spare. On the other hand, in the difficult field of criminal
procedure the sympathies of even a liberal judge are often
strained severely. Justice Black, normally a friend of indi-
vidual liberty, strays from the reservation of freedom once
in a while. 6 It is an area 'of the law which presents the dif-
ficult problem of whether we really can afford to the criminal
dregs and cut-throats of our society the fairness of criminal
procedure of which we boast. Justice Murphy would afford
that fairness. Like Thurman Arnold he saw that a fair
criminal trial is a consequence of a societal security in which
men can tolerate contradictory social values. 7  When the
criminal trial has become a mere form or relic of the toler-
ance of an earlier day, the goose-step and the commissar are
the ideals of the hour. It is not always easy to keep the
vision of such a nightmare in mind when its potentialities
speak only through the petitions of murderous felons. Yet
it must be done if the substance of our Bill of Rights is to
be preserved unimpaired. Here Frank Murphy was a good
preserver.
75 FrAcx, THE ADOPToN OF THE FOURTEENTH AmENDmNT (1908). And
see the exhaustive appendix to Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Adam-
son v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 92, 67 S. Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947).
76 We observe this especially in Mr. Justice Black's tendency to support the
government in the search and seizure cases. For example, see Harris v. United
States, 331 U. S. 145, 67 S. Ct. 1098, 91 L. Ed. 1399 (1947). Undoubtedly, his
experience as Senator in charge of more than one famous congressional investiga-
tion and the memory of the great difficulties in securing information necessary
for the purposes of government, have played a part in shaping his attitude on
this matter. See FRAwx, op. cit. supra, note 29, at 63 et seq.
77 ARmoLn, TnE SymoLs or GovERr 130 (1935).
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One final broad category of cases completes examination
of Justice Murphy's civil liberty philosophy. And it really
is the field of "civil" liberty. The writer has reference to
cases dealing with the exercise of jurisdiction by military
authorities. The primacy of the civil authority over that of
the military is a traditionally accepted political premise
which lies deep at the roots of our democratic government.
Furnishing one of the more popular dissatisfactions with
British rule out of which came the American Revolution, it
withstood even the terrible calamity of the Civil War. How-
ever, in our day some observers detect a weakening in the
conviction with which it is asserted in certain quarters. The
holdings in the Japanese exclusion cases ante,"8 the difficult
struggle to preserve civilian control over the Atomic Energy
Authority, the "hush-hush" military security bills which are
rushed through Congress without open debate-all reflect
a diminution in the devotion to the ideal of civil supremacy
over our military authorities.
If this is so, Justice Murphy is not numbered among those
who are losing faith in that ideal. In Duncan v. Kahana-
moku79 he voiced fervent objections to the exercise of mili-
tary jurisdiction over civilian offenders long after the danger
of invasion of Hawaii had passed. While the majority
reached the same result, they did so on grounds of the statu-
tory interpretation of the Organic Act of Hawaii. Justice
Murphy, rarely content to rest with statutory results when
he believed fundamental constitutional principles were in-
volved, claimed that the military trials: 80
... were forbidden by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution
of the United States, which applies in both spirit and letter
to Hawaii.
We have mentioned previously Justice Murphy's dissatis-
faction with the Court's deference to the curfew and exclu-
78 Notes 47 and 49 supra.
79 327 U. S. 304, 66 S. Ct. 606, 90 L. Ed. 688 (1946).
80 327 U. S. at 325.
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sion orders of the military authorities on the West Coast.
His distrust of military jurisdiction was not confined purely
to domestic restrictions, however. For instance, in the Appli-
cation of Yamashita,8 where a Japanese general brought
habeas corpus to test the legality of his conviction before a
military commission for violations of the "law" of war, Jus-
tice Murphy refused to join in the majority's opinion that
the mode of military procedure in this case was not review-
able by the civil courts. Joining with Justice Rutledge, he
reminded all that:8"
... in the sober after glow will come the realization of the
boundless and dangerous implications of the procedure sanc-
tioned today. No one in a position of command in an army,
from sergeant to general, can escape those implications. In-
deed, the fate of some future President of the United States
and his chiefs of staff and military advisers may well have
been sealed by this decision . . . Indeed, an uncurbed spirit
of revenge and retribution, masked in formal legal procedure
for purposes of dealing with a fallen enemy commander, can
do more lasting harm than all of the atrocities giving rise to
that spirit.
Justice Murphy stuck to his refusal to sanction the loose
and precedent-setting procedures of military tribunals, and
in Application of Homma 83 he repeated his dissent of the
Yamashita case. Finally, in the attempt by the Japanese war
criminals to have the Supreme Court review their convictions
by the international Tokyo Tribunal, he dissented without
writing any opinion.84 The latter tribunal, while not strictly
a military court, had been set up under a decree of the Su-
preme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan, General
MacArthur.
In concluding our investigation of Justice Murphy's re-
actions to the relationship between the civil and the military,
we should mention the Selective Service Act cases. In Falbo
81 327 U. S. 1, 66 S. Ct. 340, 90 L. Ed. 499 (1946).
82 327 U. S. at 28.
83 327 U. S. 759, 66 S. Ct. 520, 90 L. Ed. 992 (1946).
84 Kido v. MacArthur, 335 U. S. 906, 69 S. Ct. 197 (1948).
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v. United States,85 we find him to be the sole dissenter from
a majority holding that a draft -order of the Selective Service
Board was not reviewable, and that it was merely an inter-
mediate step in a process which would not reach its conclu-
sion until the selectee actually was accepted by the Army.
Justice Murphy felt that the rule which requires exhaustion
of one's administrative remedies was not applicable where,
as he pointed out,8" it stripped a man of his only defense
to a criminal prosecution for evasion of the Selective Service
Act. The same philosophy was reflected in his dissent in
Cox v. United States,87 where he disagreed with a majority
ruling which upheld, as supported by substantial evidence,
a draft board's refusal to classify some Jehovah's Witnesses
as ministers of religion. Once again we see Justice Murphy,
usually a staunch defender of administrative finality in mat-
ters of fact, rejecting the "substantial evidence" rule when
civil rights were in jeopardy. It is interesting to note, how-
ever, that Justice Murphy's views in these Selective Service
decisions were, to all intents and purposes, adopted in two
cases decided after the war had been concluded and the tides
of nationalism, which, it seems, unavoidably must prevail in
periods of wartime, had subsided.88 Perhaps we can specu-
late that the dangerous decisions rendered in the Japanese
curfew and exclusion cases might have gone the other way
had they been decided after the actual war had been ter-
minated.
Justice Murphy, himself a former soldier, like another
great soldier-judge, Oliver Wendell Holmes, did not alow
any misconceived romanticism or servile respect for military
85 320 U. S. 949, 64 S. Ct. 346, 88 L. Ed. 305 (1944).
88 320 U. S. at 659.
87 332 U. S. 442, 68 S. Ct. 11,5, 92 L. Ed. 59 (1947).
88 Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, 66 S. Ct. 423, 90 L. Ed. 405 (1946),
where the Court held the order of the Board to be judicially reviewable in a
criminal prosecution against a selectee who had reported for induction but refused
to submit to induction. Any distinction between the*Rstep and Fablo cases would
seem to be one without a difference. See also Gibson v. United States, 329 U. S.
338, 67 S. Ct. 301, 91 L. Ed. 331 (1946).
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glory and authority to mislead him into sanctioning the
slightest impairment of the principle of civil supremacy over
military authority, or to forget that the ultimate overseer
in maintaining that hierarchy of constitutional values should
always be the Supreme Court. The role of custodian of the
people's liberties has no finer duty than that discharged
here.
Before concluding this evaluation of Justice Murphy's
philosophy of law, we might once again briefly recall his atti-
tude in the broad field of cases lying outside the sphere of
civil liberties. We have already adverted to the wide scope
he was willing to give to the federal and state regulatory
powers, whether based on the commerce and taxation pow-
ers of the federal government or residing in the inherent
police powers of the individual states. 9 In addition, it
should be pointed out that Justice Murphy was a firm de-
fender of extensive and effective anti-trust legislation. The
limitations of time and space prevent detailed discussion of
his contribution to the precedent-making decisions in the
fields of trade regulation in general and anti-trust law in par-
ticular.9 ° Suffice to say, Frank Murphy stood firm with
the three other members of the liberal quartet, Black, Doug-
,as and Rutledge, in refusing to tolerate any slight cracks
in the legislative dikes which have been erected against
monopoly. One quotation from his dissent in Bruce's Juices
v. American Can Company 91 serves to illustrate Justice
Murphy's views in this general field. In that case the major-
ity refused to permit a buyer to defend an action for the
price of goods by showing that the seller had engaged in
price discriminations against the buyer in violation of the
Robinson-Patman Act. Justice Murphy, in whose philoso-
89 Note 25 supra.
90 See, e.g., the Yellow Cab decision wherein Justice Murphy interpreted the
sweep of the monopoly section of the Sherman Act to embrace any "appreciable
amount of interstate commerce." United States v. Yellow Cab Co. et al., 332
U. S. 218, 225, 67 S. Ct. 1560, 91 L. Ed. 2010 (1947).
91 330 U. S. 743, 67 S. Ct. 1015, 91 L. Ed. 1219 (1947).
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phy the giant equity of the public interest would always
adumbrate the dry legalisms of law suits between indi-
viduals, spoke thusly:92
We should pause long before sanctioning the recovery of
discriminating prices which Congress has found inimical to
the nation's welfare. We should be on guard against the use
of the judicial process to augment the subtle destruction of
small business contrary to the legislative will, and the erosion
of the barriers which Congress has erected against the flood-
tide of monopoly. To that end, therefore, we should reverse
the judgment below and allow courts to give full effect to the
Robinson-Patman Act.
Firm believer in the efficacy of full and vigorous anti-
trust enforcement though he was, Justice Murphy rebelled
somewhat when he imagined that the protective enclave of
the First Amendment would be infringed thereby. Thus he
dissented in the Associated Press case, 93 wherein the Asso-
ciated Press was found guilty of violating the Sherman Act
by conspiring through its by-laws and other practices to
exclude and discriminate against non-member competitors.
In his separate dissent he remarked on the fact that the
Sherman Act was being applied against the press for the
first time, and went on to remind all that:94
The tragic history of recent years demonstrates far too well
how despotic governments may interfere with the press and
other means of communication in their efforts to corrupt pub-
lic opinion and destroy individual freedom. Experience teaches
us to hesitate before creating a precedent in which might lurk
even the slightest justification for such interference by the
Government in these matters.
Thus, while a sympathetic friend of the collective efforts
of the people's representatives to use the full power of gov-
ernment against the economic and financial abuses of a
monopoly minority, he balked when the slightest specter of
the opinion-controlling police state crossed his judicial path.
92 330 U. S. at 766.
93 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, 65 S. Ct. 1416, 89 L. Ed.
2013 (1945).
94 326 U. S. at 51.
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Further demonstration of this wise caution was found in the
field of administrative law. We have previously adverted
to the fact that he was willing to forget his tolerance 6f
administrative fact-finding finality when a deportation case
was involved. Similarly in National Broadcasting Company
v. United States,95 he betrays the same apprehensions lest
political and personal rights be infringed. In that case the
majority upheld the power of the Federal Communications
Commission to issue so-called "chain-broadcasting" regula-
tions, which prohibited the granting of radio broadcasting
licenses to applicants having certain corporate and financial
relations with the networks. Justice Murphy dissented,96
and, although his opinion did not specifically indicate it, we
may surmise it was his usual anxiety over possible invasions
of the "free speech" principle that prompted him to depart
from the deference he ordinarily demonstrated toward ad-
ministrative power of regulation.
Conclusion
A critic of Roger Williams once had to admit of that pio-
neer founder of Rhode Island, that he "had the root of the
matter in him." " The same thing can safely be said of
Justice Murphy. Like Roger Williams in his day, he saw
that a Constitution, the fundamental law of a nation, could
only be interpreted by the power that created it originally,
namely, the sovereign people acting in a political capacity.
For that reason Justice Murphy, true to the Holmes tradi-
tion, allowed wide reign to the power of government. He
would not interpose his personal prejudices and predilec-
tions to stop the great social experiments that have to be
carried out by a democratic government in the Twentieth
Century, if that government is to continue to exist. Yet, as
95 319 U. S. 190, 63 S. Ct. 997, 87 L. Ed. 1344 (1943).
96 319 U. S. at 227.
97 Cotton Mather, as quoted in I PAmUGTO=N, MAnH CuRRENTS AmPmmA
THOUGHT 75 (1927).
THE PASSING OF JUSTICE MURPHY
one astute observer has pointed out, it is a matter of consider-
able controversy how far government economic regulation
and planning is compatible with the maintenance of our civil
and political freedoms." Justice Murphy demonstrated he
was alive to this fact: that liberty can be 'lost by govern-
ment action just as well as by its non-use.
Thus, as we hope these pages have recalled, Justice Mur-
phy was ever vigilant in protecting the great political free-
doms of speech, religion, press, and thought. Perhaps it
was in good measure because of 'his leadership that, in a
period when governmental activity and planning in America
reached its greatest intensity, there has been a vigorous pro-
tection of civil rights by the Court. Perhaps never before
since the days of the great Jefferson have the principles of
freedom of speech, press, and religion been more venerated
and protected by our high Court. Never before have the
political and economic rights of the American Negro been
looked after with such scrupulous caution. The hypocrites
who distort the terms "liberty" and "states' rights" to serve
as a clever masquerade behind which to oppress the Negro
and the "poor white," to give, for example, the national
tidelands oil resources to the money changers, and to attack
the public power developments of the nation, could take
a leaf from the book of Justice Murphy and some of his col-
leagues, if they are really concerned about preserving human
freedom.
One major criticism has been directed against Justice
Murphy's "judicial activism" in serving the cause of civil
liberties. Essentially, this criticism amounts to this: for the
Court to play the role of an active protector of civil liberties
is undemocratic. It tends to shift responsibility for the
preservation of minority rights away from the legislature,
the representatives of the people.99 Moreover, say some, it
98 RoTTSCAEim, THE CoNsnToTION AND SOCIO-Ec0NomIc CHANGE 235
(1948).
99 COMMAGER, MAjoRmTY RULE AND MiNoR RIGHTS 71 (1943).
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is undemocratic in that it often results in overturning legis-
lation which the state legislatures, representing their elec-
torates, have passed. The answer to this multiphrased ob-
jection is not difficult and has been referred to at some
length earlier in this article. We sanction the decisions of
the rule of the majority when they come from the duly and
democratically elected representatives of the people. When
that majority will tries to undercut or impair the basic prin-
ciples upon which it rests, namely, the free play of opposing
views, practices, parties, etc., then the Court, as guardian
of the Bill of Rights, must step in. We will not tolerate
democracy to be destroyed in its own name. Justice Murphy
grasped that. The majority must be left free to govern;
but the minorities must be left free in their efforts to become
a majority. Moreover, sectional prejudices cannot be allowed
to override the letter and spirit of the Constitution. To these
principles Justice Murphy's career on the bench was suc-
cessfully dedicated.
With the passing of Justice Murphy and his close col-
league, Justice Rutledge, the so-called Roosevelt Court has
suffered a bitter blow. Fate has taken this great team of
humanitarians. What their respective successors will be like
is open to grave speculation. 00 It is hoped, however, that
at least one of them will step forward to occupy the role of
the late Justice Murphy as special custodian of oppressed
minority groups, the vigilant watch dog of the First Amend-
ment. Justice Murphy was the conscience of the Court.
More than that, he was a great American in the Jeffersonian
mold. His contributions to the judicial heritage of a free
people will be long remembered. American Catholics can
100 The reaction to the appointments of Tom C. Clark, former Attorney
General of the United States, and Sherman Minton, former United States Senator
from Indiana and Judge of the United States Court of Appeals, to succeed the
late Justices Murphy and Rutledge has been of a mixed nature. Of the two, in
the opinion of the writer, the proved liberal Minton gives the greater promise of
stepping into the shoes of Murphy as -the strident, humanitarian voice on the
Court.
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well be proud of him, and agree with him that: "In the
scheme of democracy, as in the code of Christianity, all men
are on a common level of dignity and importance." 101
This is a truth that can stand much re-emphasizing in
these days of insecurity and fear. Justice Murphy never
forgot it; let us not.
Alfred L. Scanlan
101 As quoted in the Chicago Sun-Times, July 20, 1949, p. 12, coL 6.
